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Michael ii. v. Gerald D.: Due Process and
Equal Protection Rights of Unwed
Fathers
Introduction
As marriage and divorce patterns have changed, unmarried parents
have called upon the United States Supreme Court to consider the consti-
tutional rights of unmarried parents in relation to their children.1 Un-
wed fathers, in particular, have petitioned the Court to establish
constitutional protection for their relationships with their illegitimate
children2 under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court first recognized that an unwed father's legal re-
lationship with his out-of-wedlock child may be constitutionally pro-
tected in Stanley v. Illinois.4 In three subsequent cases decided between
1979 and 1983, the Court further defined the circumstances under which
the rights of unwed fathers merit constitutional protection.5 In the most
recent of these cases, Lehr v. Robertson,6 the Court applied what ap-
peared to be the test that courts should use to determine whether an
unwed father has a constitutionally protected interest in personal contact
with his child. The court looked to whether the father had developed a
"substantial relationship' 7 with his child. If, in addition to the biological
relationship, a "substantial" personal relationship existed between father
and child, the Court would uphold constitutional protection of the fa-
ther-child relationship.'
1. See E. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FAMILY 11-12, 21-22, 27-47 (1986).
2. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a
review of the Supreme Court cases considering the constitutional rights of unwed fathers to
develop a relationship with their illegitimate children, see Atwater, A Modern-Day Solomon's
Dilemma: What of the Unwed Father's Rights?, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 267, 275-85 (1989).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4. 405 U.S. at 658 (holding on procedural due process and equal protection grounds that
an unwed father who lived intermittently with his children over a period of 18 years was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children could be taken from him and
made wards of the state).
5. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246; Caban, 441 U.S. 380; Lehr, 463 U.S. 248.
6. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
7. Id. at 267.
8. Id. at 261, 266-67. After reviewing the facts and holdings in the three previous
Supreme Court unwed father cases, the Lehr Court found that the decisive factor in determin-
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In 1989, however, the Supreme Court affirmed a California Court of
Appeal decision denying constitutional protection to an unwed father
who had developed a personal relationship with his illegitimate daugh-
ter.9 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in the case of Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 10 declined to apply this "biological fatherhood plus" standard
to the due process claim of an unwed father. 1 Instead, Justice Scalia
tested the viability of the unwed father's asserted constitutionally pro-
tected "liberty"' 2 interest by asking whether his relationship with his
child was one that "ha[d] been treated as a protected family unit under
historic practices of our society."' 3
In Michael H., an unwed father sought to establish his paternity
and, thereby, to establish his right to court-ordered visitation with a
daughter conceived through an adulterous relationship with a married
woman.' As proof of his paternity the unwed father offered blood test
evidence establishing his paternity to a 98.07% probability. 5 Despite
this near-conclusive proof, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a
lower court holding that refused to recognize the father's paternity. 6
The court based its decision on California Evidence Code section 621,17
which creates a conclusive presumption that a child born into an extant
marriage is the offspring of the husband of that marriage. 8
The unmarried biological father and his then-six year old daughter
petitioned the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of sec-
tion 621 on procedural and substantive due process grounds. 19 Father
and daughter also appealed on equal protection grounds.20 Michael H.,
the putative father, and Victoria, his daughter, separately claimed that,
by permitting termination of their parent-child relationship without
granting Michael a fair hearing at which to rebut the marital presump-
tion, the section 621 presumption had deprived them of their procedural
ing the legitimacy of an unwed father's constitutional claim was the existence of a substantial
relationship with his illegitimate offspring. See id at 258-61, 266-67.
9. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (Scalia, L, plurality opinion), reh'g denied,
110 S. Ct. 22 (1989).
10. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
11. Id at 2342.
12. Id at 2341.
13. Id at 2342.
14. Id at 2337-38.
15. Id at 2337.
16. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987), aff'd, 109
S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
17. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989) ("(a) Except as provided in subdivision
(b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclu-
sively presumed to be a child of the marriage.").
18. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2338 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
19. Id at 2338. A court-appointed guardian ad litem appealed on the daughter's behalf.
Id. at 2337.
20. Id at 2338.
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and substantive due process rights.2 ' Victoria's equal protection chal-
lenge contended that section 621 discriminated against her because she
was barred from presenting evidence to rebut the paternal presumption
and yet either her mother or her mother's husband was free to present
the same kind of evidence.22
The Supreme Court affirmed in a plurality decision, dismissing all of
Michael and Victoria's constitutional claims.23 Justice Scalia, writing for
the four-vote plurality,24 rejected Michael and Victoria's procedural due
process claims,25 reasoning that the issues surrounding an irrebuttable
presumption of the type found in section 621 are substantive, not proce-
dural, in nature.2 6 Proceeding to Michael's substantive due process
claim, Justice Scalia found that Michael failed to establish that his
claimed liberty interest was a "fundamental" interest traditionally pro-
tected by our society,27 and that, "quite to the contrary, our [society's]
traditions have protected the marital family... against the sort of claim
Michael asserts."28
Justice Scalia waved aside Victoria's due process claims as being
merely "the obverse" of Michael's claim.29 Justice Scalia also summarily
dismissed Victoria's equal protection claim that the statute discriminated
against her based on her illegitimacy.3" The plurality opinion did not
reach Michael's equal protection claim because it had been neither raised
nor passed on below.3
Justice Stevens, writing the swing-vote opinion, concurred in the
judgment only.32 In contrast to the plurality opinion, he found that
Michael had raised a valid procedural due process issue.33 Justice Ste-
21. Id
22. Id.; CAL. EvrD. CODE § 621(c), (d) (West Supp. 1989). Under section 621, either the
mother or the husband can rebut the presumption in the first two years of the child's life, but
the presumption is otherwise conclusive.
23. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2338, 2346 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
24. Justice Scala wrote the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the entirety. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined,
concurring in the plurality opinion except footnote 6. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment only. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
dissented. Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a separate dissent. See generally
Michael H., 109 S. CL 2333.
25. Id. at 2341 (Scala, J., plurality opinion).
26. Id at 2340-41.
27. Id at 2341.
28. Id at 2342.
29. Id at 2346.
30. Id
31. Id at 2338.
32. Id at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
33. See id at 2347-49; see also id at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in
summarizing the five opinions filed in Michael H., pointed out that Justice Stevens had agreed
that the flaw inherent in a conclusive presumption was procedural.
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vens was also willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that Michael
had a liberty interest in his relationship with his daughter.34 Justice Ste-
vens argued that Michael's procedural due process claims failed, not be-
cause Michael had no constitutionally protected interest, but instead,
because California courts gave Michael a fair hearing on his paternal
rights and thus accorded him the process he was due.3 5
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, argued vigorously that the plu-
rality erred in casting the constitutionality of the section 621 conclusive
presumption as a question of substantive rather than procedural due pro-
cess rights.3 6 In separate dissenting opinions, Justice Brennan and Jus-
tice White asserted that Michael did indeed have an identifiable liberty
interest in his parental relationship with Victoria.17 Justice Brennan was
particularly critical of the analytical method Justice Scalia advanced as
the correct technique for determining whether an individual right has
traditionally been protected by society. Justice Brennan found that Jus-
tice Scalia's reliance upon a narrowly confined 8 search of the "dusty
volumes on American history" 39 converted the Constitution from a "liv-
ing charter" to a "stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the
prejudices and superstitions of a time long past."'
Part I of this Comment presents the facts and holding of the plural-
ity opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.41 Part I also outlines the individ-
ual Justices' arguments regarding both the utility of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine in procedural due process analysis and the proper
use of tradition to limit the scope of substantive due process rights.42
Part II examines the present state of unwed fathers' due process rights as
affected by the decision in Michael H. 43 Part II also argues that applica-
tion of equal protection review in Michael H. would have yielded a fairer
result and a more flexible constitutional precedent.' Part III concludes
that the opinion in Michael H. cuts back only narrowly on the reach of
unwed fathers' rights as established by the Court's previous unwed father
cases. Part III further concludes that intermediate level equal protection
review, not substantive due process review, is the preferred ground for
decision when an unwed father seeks constitutional protection for his pa-
rental right to a relationship with his child.
34. Id at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id at 2347-49.
36. Id at 2349, 2355-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 2352; id at 2360-61 (White, J., dissenting).
38. Id at 2351-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 2349.
40. Id at 2351.
41. See infra notes 45-77 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 78-190 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 205-248 and accompanying text.
I. Michael H. v. Gerald D.
A. Facts and Holding
In the summer of 1978, Carole D., a married woman, began an adul-
terous affair with Michael H., her neighbor in Playa Del Rey, Califor-
nia.45 Soon after the May 1981 birth of her first child, Victoria D.,
Carole informed Michael that she believed he might be the father of her
daughter.' In October 1981 Carole and Michael had blood tests taken
that revealed a 98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's father.47
Victoria's home life in her first three years was far from stable.48
Until June of 1984, Carole and Victoria resided with three different men
on an intermittent basis: Michael; Carole's husband, Gerald D.; and
Carole's second lover, Scott K.49 During this three year period Victoria
lived with Michael on two separate occasions which together totalled
eleven months.5" In January 1982 Carole took Victoria to visit Michael
at his place of business in St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands. Mother and
daughter remained there for a period of three months before returning to
California.51 From March 1982 through July 1983 Carole and Victoria
alternated their residence between Scott's home in California and Ger-
ald's home in New York. 2 Then, in August 1983, they returned to Car-
ole's apartment in Los Angeles where Michael lived with them for the
next eight months whenever he was not away on business trips to St.
Thomas.53 In May of 1984 Carole again left Michael, taking her then-
three year old daughter to live with her husband in New York. Carole
and Victoria remained with Gerald thereafter, continuing to reside with
him throughout the ensuing court proceedings.54
Michael was not an unwilling father.55 From the time of Victoria's
birth he asserted his interest in raising his daughter.5 6 Michael held Vic-
toria out as his child,57 he contributed to her financial support,58 and,
within the limits set by Carole's transience and choice of companions, he
attempted to establish a relationship with his daughter.5 9 In November
45. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct.*2333, 2337 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
46. Id
47. Id
48. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
49. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2337 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
50. See id
51. Id
52. Id
53. See id
54. Id at 2337.
55. Id. at 2361 (White, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id
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1982, after Carole's departure from St. Thomas and Carole's subsequent
refusal to allow him access to Victoria, Michael filed suit in California
Superior Court to establish his paternity and his right to visitation.'
Victoria, through a court-appointed guardian ad litem, also sought visita-
tion rights for Michael.61
Michael based his claim on California Civil Code section 4601,62
which allows reasonable visitation rights to a parent "unless it is shown
that the visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the
child."' 63 Section 4601 also provides that "[i]n the discretion of the court,
reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other person having an
interest in the welfare of the child." 64
1. Procedural History
In January 1985, the Superior Court granted summary judgment to
Gerald on the issue of Michael's paternity. The court held that there was
no triable issue of fact concerning Michael's paternity because, under
California Evidence Code section 621, a child born to a married woman
who lives with her husband, and whose husband is neither impotent nor
sterile, is presumed to be the child of the husband.65 The presumption is
conclusive unless either the husband or the mother rebut the presump-
tion within the first two years of the child's life.66
The Superior Court also dismissed, without trial, both Michael and
Victoria's claims for visitation rights under section 4601.67
On appeal, Michael claimed that section 621, as applied by the Su-
perior Court, violated his procedural and substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Victoria also appealed, claiming
that her procedural and substantive due process rights to maintain an
established psychological relationship with her biological parent had
been violated by the application of section 621.69 Victoria asserted as
well that the statute violated her equal protection rights because section
621 allows the husband and the mother, but not the affected child, to
0
60. Id at 2337. (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
61. Id
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1989).
63. MichaelH., 109 S. Ct. at 2339 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 4601 (West Supp. 1989)).
64. Id at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting CAL. CIrv. CODE
§ 4601).
65. See id at 2339 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (quoting CAL. EVm. CODE § 621(a)
(West Supp. 1989)).
66. Id (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c), (d)).
67. Id at 2338; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1012-13, 236 Cal. Rptr.
810, 820-21 (1987).
68. 109 S. Ct. at 2338 (Scalia, ., plurality opinion).
69. 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS
rebut the presumption of the husband's paternity. 70 Finally, in addition
to her constitutional challenge to section 621, Victoria asked the Califor-
nia appellate court to overturn the lower court's dismissal of Michael's
plea for visitation rights under section 4601.71
The California Court of Appeal affirmed, upholding section 621 and
denying both Michael and Victoria's due process claims and Victoria's
equal protection challenge to the statute.72 The Court of Appeal also
upheld the lower court's dismissal, without trial, of Michael's plea for the
right to visit his daughter.73
2. Holding
Michael and Victoria appealed to the Supreme Court after the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court denied review. In addition to the procedural and
substantive due process claims he had raised below, Michael challenged
section 621 on equal protection grounds.7 4 The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction,75 and, in a five-vote plurality decision, affirmed the
lower court holding.7 6 In so doing the Court upheld California's use of a
conclusive paternal presumption to terminate the parental rights of Vic-
toria's natural father.77
B. Procedural Due Process Analysis
L The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine
Prior to consideration of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,78 the Supreme
Court had invalidated statutes on constitutional grounds when the stat-
ute created a conclusive presumption that acted to deny the plaintiff a
hearing- prior to legal termination of his or her rights.79 Legal commen-
tators named the Court's analytical method in these cases the "irrebut-
table presumption doctrine."80
70. Id.
71. Id at 1012, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
72. Id at 1013, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
73. Id at 1012-13, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21.
74. 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2338 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
75. Id
76. 109 U.S. 2333.
77. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
78. 109 S. Ct. 2333.
79. Cleveland Bd. of Edue. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agric.
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
80. See Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449, 449-
56 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Illusory Analysis] (identifying the Supreme Court's analytical
method when faced with statutorily created irrebuttable presumptions as the "irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine," and describing the Court's modem revival of the doctrine in cases decided
in the period between 1972 and 1975); see also Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1534, 1534-44 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Irrebuttable
Summer 1990]
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The effect of the doctrine was to apply strict or intermediate scru-
tiny to a statute which employed a conclusive presumption to cut off
access to a hearing on a plaintiff's rights."1 The validity of the doctrine's
analytical approach and its applicability outside the realm of equal pro-
tection review had, however, been the subject of controversy amongst
both Supreme Court commentators82 and the members of the Court
themselves.8 3 Opposition to the doctrine derived from the belief that use
of the doctrine for procedural due process analysis resulted in unwarrant-
edly strict scrutiny of statutes when the factual situation actually re-
quired the more relaxed "rational basis" scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. 4
Although the Court abandoned the use of the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine during the post-1937 period of disenchantment with the
Presumption Doctrine] (describing the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and tracing its mod-
em evolution in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508
(1973), and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)).
81. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1618-25 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and the way the Supreme Court has applied
it to state statutes).
82. See Note, Illusory Analysis, supra note 80, at 450, 462-73 (1975) (arguing that the
doctrine is the "conceptual equivalent" of equal protection rather than due process review, id
at 450, and further arguing that irrebuttable presumptions are the equivalent of substantive
rules of law and that application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine permits improper
application of a close scrutiny test to situations involving neither a fundamental right nor a
suspect classification, and asserting that, as a consequence, "the doctrine opens the door to the
use of nonneutral principles of constitutional adjudication," id at 473); see also Note, Irrebut-
table Presumption Doctrine, supra note 80, at 1544-56 (characterizing irrebuttable presump-
tions as substantive rules of law rather than as rules of evidence, and also arguing that analysis
under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine results in an extremely strict standard of statutory
scrutiny which has no basis in articulated constitutional theory); L. TRIBE supra note 81, at
1618-25 (characterizing use of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine as an intermediate rem-
edy used by the court in intermediate level equal protection analysis and discussing criticism of
the doctrine).
83. Justice Rehnquist called the potential expansion of the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine a "virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments." Weinburger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). In his dissenting opinion in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974), Justice Rehnquist was even more adamant in his opposition to the use of
irrebuttable presumption analysis. Accusing Justice Stewart of "enlist[ing] the Court in an-
other quixotic engagement in his apparently unending war on irrebuttable presumptions," Jus-
tice Rehnquist pointed out that "countless" state statutes could be threatened by application of
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to statutes in which the statutory classifications were less
than perfectly drawn. 414 U.S. 632, 657 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also
expressed his misgivings about the Court's application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
in LaFleur. Id at 652 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell argued that the
"concept at root" in the court's irrebuttable presumption cases was often the Equal Protection
Clause "masquerading as a due process doctrine." Id; see also Note, Irrebuttable Presumption
Doctrine, supra note 80, at 1540 n.36 (1974) (summarizing the Justices' views on irrebuttable
presumptions as illustrated by cases decided between 1971 and 1974).
84. See supra notes 82-83.
interventionist aspects of substantive due process review, 5 the Court ex-
pressly revived irrebuttable presumption analysis in Stanley v. Illinois.86
In Stanley, the Court recognized an unwed father's due process right to a
hearing on his fitness prior to termination of his parental rights.8 7 De-
spite this previous application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
when considering unwed fathers' due process rights to relationships with
their children and despite Justice Brennan's objections,88 Justice Scalia
elected not to apply irrebuttable presumption analysis to decide the con-
stitutionality of the statutory conclusive presumption challenged in
Michael H. 89
2. Three Methods of Analysis in Michael H. v. Gerald D.
a. The Plurality Opinion: Section 621 Not a Procedural Rule
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, rejected Michael's conten-
tion that the conclusive presumption of paternity in California's Evi-
dence Code90 violated his procedural due process rights. 91 In a two-part
analysis, Justice Scalia first asserted that the California statute, although
phrased in terms of a presumptive rule of evidence, is not a procedural
rule but is, instead, a substantive rule of law. Justice Scalia argued that
California Evidence Code section 621 is actually the implementation of
an "'overriding social policy' 92 enacted through a substantive rule of
law by which "California declares it to be, except in limited circum-
85. Note, Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, supra note 80, at 1539-40.
86. See 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Note, Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, supra note 80, at
1542 (analyzing the facts and holding in Stanley).
87. 405 U.S. at 657. Stanley, an unwed father whose children's mother had died, chal-
lenged an Illinois statutory scheme permitting the state to make his children wards of the state
in circumstances where they had no surviving parent who wanted to care for them. The effect
of the Illinois law was to take Stanley's three children from his custody without making an
individualized determination that he was an unfit parent. In contrast, both unwed mothers
and married parents were entitled to a hearing on their parental fitness before the state could
terminate their parental rights. The difference in treatment of the parties stemmed from an
Illinois statute which defined "parent" to include both married parents and unwed mothers,
but not unwed fathers. See id. at 646-50. Although the Supreme Court in Stanley based its
ultimate holding on the Equal Protection Clause, the Court rested its equal protection holding
upon a finding that the statute's irrebuttable presumption had violated the Due Process Clause.
See id. at 647-49, 657-59; see also Note, Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, supra note 80, at
1542 (pointing out that jurisdictional constraints in Stanley required the court to base the
ultimate holding on equal protection grounds, but that the Court has subsequently treated the
case as a due process decision).
88. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2356-58 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 234041 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
90. CAL. EVD. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989).
91. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2341 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
92. Id at 2340 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 810, 816 (1987) (quoting Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 623, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 9, 10 (1981))).
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stances, irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived dur-
ing and born into an existing marriage was begotten by someone other
than the husband .... ,93
Having declared section 621 to be a substantive rather than a proce-
dural rule, Justice Scalia further asserted that the Court's previous hold-
ings striking down irrebuttable presumptions did not mandate
procedural due process analysis of Michael's challenge to the conclusive
presumption94 contained in section 621. 91 Justice Scalia argued that the
Court's previous irrebuttable presumption cases did not rest on proce-
dural due process grounds, and that, in any case, the ultimate practical,
effect of a rule phrased in terms of a "procedural" conclusive presump-
tion is no different than a rule framed in terms of a "substantive" classifi-
cation. 96 In other words, even if California's Evidence Code substituted
a rule stating that an "adulterous natural father shall not be recognized
as a legal father," 97 this restatement of the rule as a substantive classifica-
tion would have yielded the same result in Michael's case as a rule of
evidence conclusively presuming another man's paternity. Both the pro-
cedural and substantive formulations of the rule would have the effect of
denying Michael a hearing at which to present blood test evidence as
proof of his paternity. 98 From this absence of a difference in the ultimate
effect of alternative phrasings of the rule, Justice Scalia concluded that
the Court should analyze its irrebuttable presumption cases in substan-
tive rather than in procedural due process terms.99
b. Dissenting Opinions and Justice Stevens's Concurrence: Procedural
Due Process Analysis Applies
Three Justices subscribed to Justice Scalia's contention that Michael
93. Id. at 2340 (emphasis in original).
94. The Supreme Court has used the terms "conclusive presumption" and "irrebuttable
presumption" interchangeably. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644
(1974).
95. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Justice Scalia identi-
fied Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), and Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), as examples of the Court's previous
irrebuttable presumption cases.
96. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 2340.
98. Id.
99. See id at 2340-41 ("[Olur 'irrebuttable presumption' cases must ultimately be ana-
lyzed as calling into question not the adequacy of procedures but-like our cases involving
classifications framed in other terms-the adequacy of the 'fit' between the classification and
the policy that the classification serves." (citations omitted)). In determining that irrebuttable
presumptions should not trigger procedural due process analysis, Justice Scalia relied in part
on previous criticism in Supreme Court opinions of the potential for harsh effects on legislative
judgments arising from irrebuttable presumption analysis.
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raised no valid procedural due process issue. 00 In contrast, the remain-
ing five Justices agreed that Michael's challenge to section 621 merited
procedural due process analysis."01 Although Justice Stevens and Justice
White did not explicitly argue with the plurality's analysis, they im-
pliedly disagreed by subjecting Michael's claim to procedural due process
analysis. 10 2
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun,
expressly challenged the dismissal of Michael's procedural due process
claim. 103 Although conceding that "all conclusive presumptions [may],
in a sense, [be] substantive rules of law,"'' Justice Brennan pointed out
that section 621 falls into the special category of substantive rules that,
by presuming a fact relevant to a certain class of litigation, takes both the
form and the effect of a procedural rule.'05 Justice Brennan viewed the
argument that California deems the paternity of the child to be irrelevant
when the child's mother is married to another man as "patently false"'
10 6
because "California cares very much about paternity when the husband
is impotent or sterile."' 1 7
Justice Brennan also disputed Justice Scalia's argument that the
Court could not properly apply procedural due process analysis to con-
clusive presumptions. 0 8 Justice Brennan asserted that, to the contrary, a
conclusive presumption "declare[s] a certain fact relevant, indeed con-
trolling[, and, at the same time, denies] a particular class of litigants a
hearing to establish that fact .... [It thus contains] precisely the kind of
flaw that procedural due process is designed to correct."' "°o
c. Analysis of Unwed Fathers' Procedural Due Process Rights: Justice
Stevens's Concurrence and Dissenting Opinions
Although Justice Stevens agreed with the dissenting Justices that
Michael's challenge required procedural analysis, 110 he concurred with
100. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the entirety of the plurality opinion. Justice O'Connor
and Justice Kennedy also concurred in all portions of the plurality opinion with the exception
of the "tradition" analysis in footnote 6. See id at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring in all but
footnote 6).
101. Id at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Five Justices agree that the flaw inhering in a
conclusive presumption that terminates a constitutionally protected interest without any hear-
ing whatsoever is a procedural one." (emphasis in original)).
102. See id at 2347-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id at 2360-63
(White, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 2357.
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id (citing CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 621(a) (West Supp. 1988)).
108. See id at 2357-58.
109. Id at 2358.
110. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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the plurality opinion in upholding the validity of the California stat-
ute. 11 Justice Stevens, however, rested his concurrence upon an analysis
that expressed considerable disagreement with Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion. Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens applied procedural due
process analysis to Michael's claim,' 12 and he was also willing to assume
that Michael had a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship
with Victoria.1 3 Justice Stevens disagreed as well with the plurality's
interpretation of the effect section 621 exerted on Michael's bid for visita-
tion rights."' Justice Stevens argued that, although application of the
section 621 presumption denied Michael visitation rights as a "parent"
under California's child visitation statute, Michael had been given the
opportunity to prove that he should be granted visitation rights as an
"other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.""' Thus,
according to Justice Stevens, Michael received the evidentiary hearing
mandated by the Due Process Clause." 6
Both Justice Brennan and Justice White, writing in separate dis-
sents, agreed that Michael's procedural due process rights had been vio-
lated by California's application of California Evidence Code section
111. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2347-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
112. See iL at 2347-49; see also id at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in
summarizing the five opinions filed in Michael H., pointed out that Justice Stevens had agreed
that the flaw inherent in a conclusive presumption was procedural.
113. .Michael H., 109.S. Ct. at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. See id at 2347-48.
115. Id at 2347. Justice Stevens pointed out that California Civil Code § 4601 provides
that "'[reasonable visitation rights [shall be awarded] to a parent unless it is shown that the
visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the discretion of the court,
reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare
of the child."' Id (emphasis added by Justice Stevens) (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 4601
(West Supp. 1989)).
116. See id at 2347-49. Justice Stevens was alone among the members of the Court in his
interpretation of California law. Justice Scalia, Justice Brennan, and Justice White agreed that
application of the section 621 presunption created an absolute bar preventing the California
trial judge from granting Michael visitation with Victoria. See also id at 2339-40 (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion); id. at 2355-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id at 2361-62 (White, J., dissent-
ing). The source of this disagreement between Justice Stevens and the other Justices lay in
differing interpretations of both the trial court holding in Michael's case and of the underlying
California case law applying the section 621 presumption. See id at 2347-48 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id at 2355-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Unlike the other Justices, Justice Stevens believed that existing California case law inter-
preting section 621 gave the trial judge discretion to determine that Victoria's interests would
be best served by granting Michael reasonable visitation rights as an "other person having an
interest in the welfare of. the child" as permitted by the second sentence of California Civil
Code § 4601. See id at 2347-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2355-56 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also believed that the trial judge in Michael's case had
actually exercised that discretion by evaluating the relationship between Michael and Victoria
before deciding to permanently deny Michael visitation rights with his child. See id, at 2348
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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C. Substantive Due Process Analysis
1. Historical Recognition of Unwed Fathers' Family Rights: A
"Substantial Relationship" Test
In the search to discover "[w]here, beyond the [specific text of] the
Bill of Rights, is the 'substance' of due process to come from,"'" 8 the
Supreme Court has struggled with the problem of finding a workable
theory for identifying rights deemed so "fundamental" as to require pro-
tection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."19
The Supreme Court has identified the family unit as a context in which
constitutionally protected interests often arise. 12 0 - Rights relating to
"'freedom of personal choice in matters of... family life' "121 springing
from within the "integrity of the family unit"'1 22 have, been found to de-
serve "deference and, absent a powerful countervailing [state] interest,
protection"'121 under the Due Process Clause.
With regard to unmarried fathers' rights to "'the companionship,
care, custody, and management of [their] children,' "124 the Court has
specifically recognized as "cognizable and substantial"'' 25 the "liberty"
117. Id. at 2358-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 2362-63 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan focused the bulk of his opinion on a critique of the plurality's analytical method. In
contrast, Justice White did not expressly argue with the plurality's analytical method, but,
instead, devoted his opinion to a detailed'analysls demonstrating that the Court's previous
unwed father cases provided ample precedent for a finding that Michael's efforts at developing
a relationship with Victoria entitled him to constitutional protection of his parental interest in
a relationship with his child. See id. at 2360-63 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined
in Justice White's opposition to the plurality opinion, but Justice White, unlike the other dis-
senting Justices (Justices Marshall and Blackmun), chose not to join in Justice Brennan's cri-
tique of the plurality's analytical methodology.
118. L. TRINE, supra note 81, at 777.
119. Id at 774-80 (outlining the problems confronting the Court in defining the scope of
the "liberty" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, and briefly describing the theories the
Court has employed to identify interests that, although not described specifically in the text of
the Constitution, are nevertheless deserving of constitutional protection).
120. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
121. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639 (1974)). "[fIt is now firmly established that 'freedom of personal choice in matters of...
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" Id (quoting LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639).
122. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 ('The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ninth Amendment." (citations
omitted)); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 258 ("[Tlhe Court has found that the relationship of lpve and duty
in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection.").
123. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
124. Id. (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
125. Id. at 652.
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interest of an unwed father in a relationship with his child. 126 The fact
that the relationship is "unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony"127 has
not precluded recognition of the father's liberty interest, but it has meant
that the father must do more than merely sire his child. 28 Thus, in the
absence of the legal parental relationship created by marriage, the Court
has recognized a biological father's due process liberty interest in the
parent-child relationship only when the father has established a "sub-
stantial relationship"1 29 with his illegitimate offspring.13 0
2. Tradition as a Limit on the Substantial Relationship Test
In the four unwed father cases preceding the decision in Michael H.,
the Court consistently found a constitutionally protected interest when a
significant personal relationship existed between the biological father and
his child. 1 ' However, in Caban v. Mohammed,13 2 the dissenters argued
126. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257-58; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1983); Stanley, 405
U.S. at 651.
127. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
128. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 ("When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his
child' his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the
Due Process Clause." (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979))); see also
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-52 (finding that an unwed father who had lived intermittently with his
three children over a period of eighteen years had a constitutionally protected interest under
the Due Process Clause); Quillion, 434 U.S. at 255 (denying due process protection to an
unwed father objecting to adoption of his illegitimate child without his consent). The Court inQuillion v. Walcott found no requirement to look beyond the best interests of the child when
the father has made no attempt to develop a relationship with his child:
this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or legal
custody of his child .... Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot
say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the
adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the "best interests of the child."
Quillion, 434 U.S. at 255.
129. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in a case decided on equal protection grounds,
first used the words "substantial relationship" to describe an unwed father's constitutionally
protected relationship with his illegitimate child. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93
(1979).
130. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-52 (finding a "cognizable and substantial" interest in an un-
wed father who had "sired and raised" his children); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (denying due
process protection to an unwed father who had not "demonstrat[ed] a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child."'
(quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392)); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 (denying an unwed father protec-
tion under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses because he had "never exer-
cised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus [had] never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection or care of [his]
child").
131. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text; Caban 441 U.S. at 392-94 (finding a
valid equal protection claim when the biological father had both established a substantial rela-
tionship with his child and admitted his paternity).
132. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
that, under some circumstances, the Court should limit the substantive
due process rights of unwed fathers even when they have established the
requisite "substantial relationship" with their illegitimate children.' 33
In the past, the Court has looked to "tradition" as a method of lim-
iting the scope of constitutional rights accorded to family relationships
under the Due Process Clause.' The efficacy and appropriateness of
this technique, however, has previously been the subject of dispute be-
tween the members of the Court.3 5 The Court returned to this debate'
36
when the facts in Michael H. v. Gerald D. forced the Justices to consider
whether to limit use of the substantial relationship test to confer constitu-
tional rights on an unwed father under circumstances in which the un-
wed father's biological child was "conceived within and born into an
extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child."' 137
3. Finding the Tradition Limiting Fundamental Rights: The Plurality's
Method
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality,' 38 discounted the use of the
"substantial relationship" test and thereby disposed of Michael's reliance
on that test as set out in the Court's previous unwed father cases.'39 Es-
tablishment of a protected liberty interest in the Court's previous unwed
133. See i at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me that the absence of a legal tie
with the mother may in such circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever substan-
tive constitutional claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father's actual relationship
with the children."); see also id at 414-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, although the
unwed father had developed a relationship with his child, in the context of adoption, a father's
rights could be denied on the grounds that the child's best interests would thereby be better
served).
134. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opin-
ion) (striking down a zoning ordinance defining the type of "family" permitted to live in single-
family residential neighborhoods to exclude extended family groups, and pointing out that
"[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines, but
rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society."' (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(H/arlan, J., concurring))).
135. See id at 549 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White criticized Justice Powell's at-
tempts to limit the potential scope of substantive due process rights by according constitutional
protection only to rights that are deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. For
Justice White, this reliance on history and tradition. suggested a "far too expansive charter" for
the Court, which provided little meaningful guidance to the Court's substantive due process
review because "fw]hat the deeply rooted traditions of this country are is arguable; which of
them deserie the protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable." See also L.
TRIBE supra note 81, at 778 n.5 (analyzing the Justices' debate in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land over the appropriate way to find a fundamental right).
136. See infra notes 138-190 and accompanying text.
137. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
138. Justice Scalia was joined by Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy in all but footnote 6.
139. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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father cases, Justice Scalia argued, depended not upon the "isolated fac-
tors" of biological fatherhood plus an established parental relationship
standard, but, instead, upon the "historic respect [and even] sanctity...
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family."'"'
The test of Michael's liberty interest, therefore, was not merely whether
Michael had developed a parental relationship with Victoria, but
whether the type of relationship he had with Victoria traditionally had
been treated as a "protected family unit under the historic practices of
our society."' 141
Having thus declared that the Court should look to "tradition" to
identify a constitutionally protected liberty interest, Justice Scalia contin-
ued by demonstrating the proper way to determine whether society had
traditionally protected that interest.
a. The Historical Search
Justice Scalia looked first to English common law treatises dating
from both the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries 42 for evidence of an
historic tradition granting unwed fathers standing to rebut the marital
presumption of paternity. 43 Finding no evidence of such protection in
the "older sources [or] cases,"'" Justice Scalia next reviewed a 1952
American Law Reports annotation 45 on state statutes that granted
rights to dispute the marital presumption."4 Justice Scalia searched for
evidence that the formerly "rigid protection of the marital family" had
been relaxed in "modem times" to allow for the protection of the rights
of putative fathers.1 47 When the American Law Reports annotation con-
tained no mention of statutes expressly granting unwed biological fathers
standing to rebut the marital presumption, 4 ' Justice Scalia concluded
that not only have the nation's traditions not protected the rights of fa-
thers in Michael's position, but that "quite to the contrary, our traditions
have protected the marital family... against the sort of claim Michael
asserts." 149
140. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2342 (Scalia, 3., plurality opinion). Justice Scalia defined the
"unitary family" as the family unit as "typified... by the marital family, but also includ[ing]
the household of unmarried parents and their children." Id. at n.3.
141. Id at 2342.
142. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986),
also resorted to conducting a search of English common law treatises as a way of demonstrat-
ing that society had not traditionally protected an asserted right.
143. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2342-43 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
144. Id at 2343.
145. Id (citing 53 A.L.R. 2d 572 (1952)).
146. Justice Scalia examined the statutes of California, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Illinois,
and New York. Id
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id at 2342.
Justice Scalia did concede that the law in some states "currently
appears to allow" natural fathers to obtain legal recognition of their
parenthood by rebutting the paternal presumption.15 He maintained,
however, that even if the Court found a universal tradition permitting
unwed fathers to rebut the marital presumption, that finding would be
"ultimately irrelevant"' 51 to the establishment of Michael's liberty inter-
est because the right to obtain "parental prerogatives"'52 such as visita-
tion rights, not the right to a legal declaration of parenthood, was the
right at issue in Michael's case.'53 Hence, Justice Scalia concluded, the
tradition that counts is "whether the States in fact award substantive
parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within and born
into an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child."' 54 Hav-
ing redefined the relevant traditional interest, Justice Scalia asserted that
the Court was not aware of "a single case, old or new"'155 that protected
this specific type of interest. He then declared that Michael's claim was
"not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests
are made."' 156
b. Confining the Search for Tradition to the Specific Constitutional
Right at Issue
In the face of criticism from both dissenting5 7 and concurring' "58
Justices, Justice Scalia acknowledged that, before searching for historical
evidence of traditional protection of Michael's asserted right, the plural-
ity had used a mode of analysis that had the effect of defining that right
at the most specific level possible.'5 9 Thus, instead of looking for tradi-
tional protection of parenthood, the plurality looked for "historical tradi-
tions relating specifically to the parental rights of adulterous biological
fathers who find themselves in circumstances where the marital family
wants to care for the child."'" Justice Scalia asserted that defining the
constitutional right at issue more generally would result in "imprecise
guidance" to judges. This imprecision in the constitutional precedent,
would, in turn, permit arbitrary decision-making processes wherein
150. d at 2344 (citing Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship
Test, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 373 (1988)).
151. Id
152. Id at 2343 (emphasis in original).
153. Id
154. Id at 2344.
155. Id
156. Ia
157. Id. at 2350-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
158. Id. at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring in all but footnote 6, joined by Kennedy, J.).
159. rdi at 2344 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("We refer to the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified.").
160. Id
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judges would "dictate" rather than "discern" society's views. 1 61 Justice
Scalia argued that this result could be avoided if the Court consulted
tradition by referring to "the most specific level at which a relevant tradi-
tion protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified."' 162
Responding to Justice Brennan's assertion that the plurality's
method for identifying a protected liberty interest was "novel,"' 63 and to
Justice O'Connor's observation that Justice Scalia's search for tradition-
ally protected interests was inconsistent with the level of generality used
in the Court's previous due process cases,16' Justice Scalia argued that
the Court had used the same method of analysis in its opinions in both
Bowers v. Hardwick 65 and Roe v. Wade. 166 Justice Scalia further noted
that the Court's holdings in Griswold v. Connecticut 167 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird 168 did not preclude the Court from rejecting Michael's claim when
there was a "longstanding and still extant societal tradition withholding
the very right pronounced [by Michael] to be the subject of [his] liberty
interest." 169
c. Limiting Potential Expansion of Unwed Fathers' Rights
In addition to using his "specific historic tradition" analysis to limit
the rights of unwed fathers who have developed substantial relationships
with their natural children, Justice Scalia, in dicta, employed the same
"historic tradition" analysis to limit the right of unwed fathers to develop
a relationship with their children. 170 In Lehr v. Robertson, 7' the Court
stated that the biological connection of an unwed father to his offspring
affords the natural father a unique, and possibly a constitutionally pro-
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2347 (O'Connor, J., concurring in all but footnote 6).
165. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(arguing that in Bowers v. Hardwick the Court had conducted its search of old records based
on a similarly specific focus on the precise type of sexual conduct at issue).
166. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
("In Roe v. Wade, we spent about a fifth of our opinion negating the prolsition that there was
a longstanding tradition of laws proscribing abortion." (citation omitted)).
167. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down application to married persons of a state statute
forbidding both the use of contraceptives and assistance given in aid of their use, on the ground
that the statute invaded the constitutionally protected right to privacy).
168. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a statute forbidding distribution of contraceptives
except to married persons on grounds that individuals, whether married or single, have a con-
stitutional privacy right to decide, without government interference, whether or not to con-
ceive a child).
169. Michael H, 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6. (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
170. See id at 2345 n.7 and accompanying text.
171. 463 U.S, 248 (1983).
tected, opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring. 72 The
Lehr Court also observed, however, that the lack of the marital tie may,
in some circumstances, justifiably limit constitutional rights that might
otherwise exist. 173
Justice Scalia asserted that such limiting circumstances were present
when the natural father's unique opportunity to develop a relationship
with his child conflicted with the "similarly unique" opportunity of the
mother's husband to develop a relationship with his wife's child. 74 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Scalia declared that Michael's parental rights are lim-
ited by circumstances in which "the mother is, at the time of the child's
conception and birth, married to and cohabitating with another man"
and, in addition, both the mother and her husband "wish to raise the
child as the offspring of their union."' 75
4. Criticism of the Plurality's Analytical Method
The plurality's analytical method for finding a protected liberty in-
terest received only limited support from the three concurring Justices
176
and vigorous opposition from three of the four dissenting Justices.
177
Although Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion did not disagree
with the plurality's reliance on tradition to dispose of Michael's constitu-
tional claim, Justice O'Connor doubted the wisdom of Justice Scalia's
assertion that the Court should consult "'the most specific level'" of
tradition available.'1 7  Justice O'Connor worried that the plurality's
mode of analysis was "somewhat inconsistent" with both the results
179
172. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2345 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (citing Lehr, 463 U.S. at
262-65).
173. Id (citing Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260).
174. Id
175. Id at n.7 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia expressly limited the reach of his
opinion to the relevant facts of Michael's case because "it is at least possible that our traditions
lead to a different conclusion with regard to adulterous fathering of a child whom the marital
parents do not wish to raise as their own." Id
176. Id at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring in all but footnote 6, joined by Kennedy, J.);
id at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id at 2360 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White impliedly disagreed with the plurality's analytical method by arguing against the plural-
ity's finding that a natural father in Michael's position could never have a constitutionally
protected relationship with his child.
177. Id at 2349-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
Although Justice White did not argue at length with the plurality's analytical method, the
implication of his arguments in support of Michael's liberty interest was that he also disagreed
with the plurality's appeal to tradition as a way of limiting the scope of an unwed father's
liberty interest in a relationship with his child. See id at 2347-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also id at 2360-63 (White, J., dissenting).
178. 109 S. Ct. at 2346 (O'Connor, J., concurring in all but footnote 6) (quoting the plural-
ity opinion at 2344 n.6).
179. See id at 2346 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
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and the analytical method employed"' ° in the Court's previous cases.
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor was unwilling to "foreclose the unantici-
pated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis." ''
Justice Brennan was more adamant in his opposition. Calling Jus-
tice Scalia's method for analyzing due process questions "a significant
and unfortunate departure from [the Court's] prior cases and from sound
constitutional decision-making,"' 82 Justice Brennan devoted over half of
his dissenting opinion 8 3 to criticism of the plurality's "exclusively histor-
ical"' 84 method of analysis. Justice Brennan first disputed the efficacy of
the plurality's reliance upon tradition to achieve the plurality's stated
goal of placing an objective limit on judicial recognition of constitution-
ally guaranteed interests.' 5 Justice Brennan further argued that the plu-
rality's exclusive reliance upon tradition,'86 and particularly its focus on
the very specific level of tradition advocated by Justice Scalia, 117 "ignores
the good reasons for limiting the role of 'tradition' in interpreting the
Constitution's deliberately capacious language."'88  Finally, Justice
Brennan contended that, by looking to tradition for evidence of protec-
tion of the unitary family, the plurality not only waves aside precedent
set by the Court's previous cases considering the rights of unwed fa-
thers, ' 9 but also extinguishes Michael's liberty interest by prematurely
balancing Michael's parental interest against the state's interest in pro-
180. See id at 2346-47 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987), and United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987)).
181. Id at 2347.
182. Id at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Id at 2349-54.
184. Id at 2349.
185. Id at 2349 (arguing that the concept of tradition cannot be used to place a "discerni-
ble border around the Constitution" because it is "as malleable and as elusive as 'liberty'
itself," and because it is impossible to agree as to the content of a particular tradition, the
significance of that tradition for defining a liberty interest, the requisite strength of the tradi-
tion, or even where to look for the relevant tradition).
186. Id at 2349.
187. Id at 2350-51.
188. Id at 2351. Justice Brennan argued that the plurality's analytical formula was 'mis-
guided" because it did not allow the Court to adapt to a changing world by noticing that the
rationale for the paternal presumption had been rendered obsolete by use of modem blood
tests to prove paternity with virtually complete accuracy. Justice Brennan further argued that
the plurality's reliance upon merely identifying rights "traditionally pi ,tected by our society"
(emphasis in original) rather than upon identifying rights "traditionally ... thought important"
(emphasis added) corrupted the Fourteenth Amendment's intended purpose of protecting the
rights of unpopular minorities whose needs for constitutional protection arise precisely because
their rights have not traditionally been protected. Id
189. Id at 2352 (arguing that the plurality chose to "reinvent the wheel" instead of exam-
ining the specific parent-child relationship under consideration as "commanded by our prior
cases and by common sense" (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983))).
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tecting the marital family.19
H. The Future of Unwed Fathers' Rights
The complex and lengthy arguments191 in Michael H. v. Gerald D.
concerning the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and the proper use of
tradition must not be allowed to obscure the minimal effect of the case's
result upon future adjudication of unwed fathers' claims under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 192
190. See ia at 2353-54. Justice Brennan argued that the plurality opinion departed from
the Court's established method of analysis under the Due Process Clause by conflating the
question whether Michael has a constitutionally protected liberty interest with the inquiry into
what procedures the state could permissibly use to restrict or terminate that interest. Justice
Brennan contended that Justice Scalia looked first at the "relationship that the unwed father
seeks to disrupt, rather than the one he seeks to preserve," and, in so doing, erroneously al-
lowed the State's interest in terminating Michael's relationship with Victoria to play a role in
deciding whether that relationship is a constitutionally protected interest. Id at 2353.
Justice White also accused the plurality of "balancing away" Michael's interest in estab-
lishing his paternity. Id. at 2362 (White, J., dissenting). In Lehr v. Robertson, an earlier un-
wed father case, Justice White explained the error behind premature balancing of the private
and state interests at issue in a procedural due process claim:
[A]lthough "a weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the
form of hearing required in particular situations... to determine whether due pro-
cess requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the
nature of the interest at stake... to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection .... "
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 270 (1983) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
570-71 (1972) (emphasis in original)).
Justice Scalia, arguing in rebuttal to Justice Brennan's criticism of the plurality's analysis,
denied having relied on any independent balancing of the competing state and private interests.
Instead, Justice Scalia asserted that the plurality rested its decision upon the absence of tradi-
tional protection for the parental interests of adulterous biological fathers. According to Jus-
tice Scalia, that tradition merely reflected a balancing that society itself, not the plurality, had
already done. Michizel H., 109 S. Ct. at 2345 n.7 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
191. Justice Brennan provides a useful summary of the Justices' votes on the multiple is-
sues and modes of analysis addressed in Michael H.:
In a case that has yielded so many opinions as has this one, it is fruitful to begin by
emphasizing the common ground shared by a majority of this Court. Five Members
of the Court refuse to foreclose the possibility that a natural father might ever have a
constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was
married to and cohabiting with another man at the time of the child's conception and
birth. Five Justices agree that the flaw inhering in a conclusive presumption that
terminates a constitutionally protected interest without any hearing whatsoever is a
procedural one. Four Members of the Court agree that Michael H. has a liberty
interest in his relationship with Victoria, and one assumes for purposes of this case
that he does ....
Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations to other parts of the opinion
omitted) (emphasis in original).
192. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
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A. Minimal Impact on Unwed Fathers' Substantive Due Process Rights
At the time that Michael H. v. Gerald D. was argued before the
Supreme Court, the success of an unwed father's substantive due process
challenge appeared to rest on whether he had formed a "substantial rela-
tionship" with his child.193 Furthermore, the Court appeared to have
assumed in its opinion in Lehr v. Robertson 94 that an unwed father has a
constitutionally protected interest in an opportunity to establish that sub-
stantial relationship. 195 Although the Supreme Court hinted in Lehr that
the unwed father's lack of a legal tie to the mother might, in some cir-
cumstances, "'appropriately place a limit' "196 on the substantive due
process claims a father might otherwise have by virtue of his developed
relationship with his child,197 the Court did not specifically define these
potentially limiting circumstances.
In Michael H., Justice Scalia undertook the task of identifying these
limiting circumstances. Justice Scalia asserted that due process protec-
tion should be limited to father-child relationships arising from within a
"unitary family.' 198 It is important, however, to be aware that Justice
Scalia was unable to persuade a majority of the Court to thus modify the
substantial relationship test, and that the scope of the holding in Michael
H., as applicable to an unwed father's rights, is consequently extremely
narrow.
The Court's holding in Michael H. rests on the votes of five Justices
cast in three separate opinions employing quite different analytical meth-
ods.199 For this reason, even a slight deviation from the facts of Michael
H. might well result in a different decision in a subsequent unwed father
case. For example, the holding in Michael H. does not support the prop-
osition that an adulterous father will always be denied parental rights.
193. See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text. An unwed father's equal protection
claim also apparently rested on the same test. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-68
(1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978).
194. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
195. See id at 262-65; see also MichaelH., 109 S. Ct. at 2345 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
("In Lehr v. Robertson ... we observed that '[t]he significance of the biological connection is
that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a rela-
tionship with his offspring,' and we assumed that the Constitution might require some protec-
tion of that opportunity." (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (citations omitted))).
196. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-61 n.16 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Stewart's dis-
sent in Caban, 441 U.S. at 397) (quoted approvingly in Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2345 (Scalia,
J., plurality opinion)). Justice Stewart thought such circumstances could arise in situations
where the " 'wishes [of the mother and of the unwed father] are in conflict, and the child's best
interests are served by a resolution in favor of the mother."' Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-61 (quoting
Caban, 441 U.S. at 397)).
197. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-61.
198. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2342 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
199. See supra note 191.
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Justice Scalia expressly left open the possibility that an adulterous father
might be accorded constitutional protection in cases where the marital
parents do not want to raise the child as their own. °°
Furthermore, even in cases where the marital family wants to raisd
the child, the decision in Michael H. should be read very narrowly be-
cause Justice Stevens did not concur with the plurality's finding that
Michael did not assert a constitutionally protected interest. °" Instead,
Justice Stevens rested his swing vote opinion on his belief that, prior to
the termination of Michael's rights, California courts had given Michael
an opportunity to show that termination of his parental rights was not in
the best interests of his child.2"2 Thus, according to Justice Stevens,
Michael had not been denied his constitutional right to a hearing prior to
the termination of his right to visitation with his daughter.
Justice Stevens did not agree with the plurality's argument that an
unwed father in Michael's situation could not possibly have a constitu-
tionally protected interest under the Due Process Clause. He concurred
with the plurality's result only because he, unlike all of the other Justices,
believed that California's statutory scheme, as interpreted by California
courts, did not deny Michael his due process right to a hearing at which
to present evidence showing that Victoria's best interests would be served
by granting him visitation as an "other person" pursuant to California's
child visitation statute.20 3
The consequence of Justice Stevens's disagreement with the plural-
ity's due process analysis is that Michael H. v. Gerald D. cannot be used
as authority to deny an adulterous unwed father's substantive due pro-
cess right to a fair hearing prior to termination of his parental rights." *
200. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2345 n.7 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
201. Supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
202. Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens believed that California
case law interpreting California Evidence Code § 621 did not create an absolute bar preventing
the California trial court judge from allowing an adulterous biological father an opportunity to
prove that he should be granted visitation as an "other person" under California Civil Code
§ 4601. Justice Stevens also believed that the trial court had, in fact, given Michael this oppor-
tunity. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1989).
204. Michael H. does, however, have a significant effect in California on an adulterous
father's parental rights. Whereas a legal parent has a right to visitation under section 4601
unless a showing has been made that it is not in the child's best interests for the court to grant
visitation, Justice Stevens's opinion supports the proposition that an adulterous biological fa-
ther may be treated differently than a legal parent. According to Justice Stevens, there is no
constitutional barrier preventing the state from denying an adulterous natural father visitation
as an "other person" unless the father can prove to the court that visitation is in the child's best
interests. Thus, the decision in Michael H. authorizes California to shift to an adulterous
father, as distinguished from all other fathers, the burden of proving that the child's best inter-
ests are served by parental visitation.
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B. Equal Protection Rights of Unwed Fathers
In Michael H., the Court avoided considering the unwed father's
equal protection claim.2"5 Consequently, the holding in Michael H.
should in no way be relied upon to foreclose a future unwed father's
equal protection claim brought on similar facts. On the contrary, in fu-
ture unwed father cases, the Court should use existing Supreme Court
precedent concerning unwed fathers' rights to craft a narrowly tailored
equal protection holding that is protective of adulterous natural fathers'
parental rights. Reliance on equal protection grounds, rather than on
due process grounds, would enable the Court to protect the interests of
biological fathers and their children without addressing the difficult issue
of the proper scope of an unwed father's liberty interest in a relationship
with his child. Thus, if another unwed father who has developed a "sub-
stantial relationship" with his illegitimate child challenges a statute simi-"
lar in effect to California Evidence Code section 621, the Court could
avoid the quagmire of argument over which type of parental rights are
"traditionally protected"20 6 by holding that the Equal Protection
Clause207 restricts the states' ability to employ sex-based statutory dis-
tinctions to terminate parental rights.
L Advantages of Equal Protection Analysis
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court faced the difficult
task of deciding which of two competing family interests should receive
priority treatment when both of those interests arguably merited substan-
tive due process protection. Although not expressly raised by either the
Court or the parties, the need to make this choice was impliedly raised by
the factual circumstances of the suit. For example, Victoria's mother
and her husband could have tried to argue that Supreme Court precedent
supports the proposition that, as members of a constitutionally protected
family unit,2°8 their interests should be paramount. Michael's suit, on
the other hand, relied on constitutional precedent protecting the right of
individual parents to maintain relationships with their children.2" Un-
derlying Michael's express reliance on his individual parental rights was
205. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2338 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(asserting that jurisdictional considerations precluded addressing Michael's equal protection
claim).
206. See supra notes 140-190 and accompanying text.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
208. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
209. See, eg., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). "The rights to conceive and to
raise one's children have been deemed 'essential' (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923)), 'basic civil rights of man' (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)), and '[r]ights far more precious... than property rights' (quoting May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953)). 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents... .'" (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
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an implied argument that Michael's constitutionally protected interest in
caring for his child deserved priority over the conflicting interests of the
members of Carole and Gerald's family unit. The Court thus faced the
prospect that, if its decision in Michael H. recognized an adulterous un-
wed father's absolute substantive due process right to a relationship with
his child, the resulting precedent would eventually force the Court to
expressly balance a natural father's constitutional right to a father-child
relationship against conflicting constitutionally protected rights residing
in an adulterously conceived child's mother and her husband.
a. Equal Protection Review as a Flexible Tool for Protecting Individuals
Without Creating New Protected Rights
When faced with this prospect of engaging in a Solomon-like balanc-
ing of the interests of family members, the Court can appropriately turn
to equal protection review in place of the more judicially controversial
substantive due process review.210 Equal protection review is appropri-
ate in circumstances like those present in Michael H. because it enables
the Court to protect individuals like the unwed father in Michael H. from
unfair and arbitrary state action without, at the same time, creating
wholly new rights in all of the nation's citizens.211
This special flexibility of equal protection analysis as a tool for
avoiding the controversy surrounding the identification of fundamentally
protected rights is in the "means-focused ' 2 12 or "intermediate scru-
210. See, ag., Wright, Judicial Review and Equal Protection, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
1, 16-18 (1980) (briefly describing the dangers that restraint-oriented judges see in allowing
activist judges to use non-text-based substantive due process review as a weapon with which to
"impose their notions of good policy on the citizenry," id, at 16, and arguing that the Equal
Protection Clause, unlike the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause,
does not permit "unchecked judicial activism" because "however expansively read, the equal
protection clause has only a limited utility as a tool for imposing judicial views on the legisla-
tive process." Id at 17).
211. See Wright, supra note 210, at 17-18. The author argues that the judiciary cannot
misuse the Equal Protection Clause as a tool for imposing policy on the legislatures because "it
speaks in relative, not absolute terms. Unlike the privileges and immunities clause and the due
process clause, the equal protection clause cannot be invoked to require either the national
government or the states to create wholly new rights in their residents." Id. The author also
pointed out that the Equal Protection Clause "merely commands that governmental benefits
and immunities shall be available to all, if granted to any." Id at 18; see also Gunther, In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (1972) (advocating the use of equal protection analysis to make a
modest but real inquiry into the rationality of state statutes rather than employing inherently
value-laden substantive due process intervention).
212. See Gunther, supra note 211, at 20-24. In 1972 Professor Gunther identified the then-
emerging trend in equal protection cases to evaluate the appropriateness of the statutory means
used to achieve state objectives. Professor Gunther distinguished this new "means-focused"
analytical method from both the "ends-focused" method involved in fundamental rights-based
equal protection and the "old equal protection" method. He argued that the distinction lay in
the type of statutory analysis done in each of the three modes. He pointed out that "old equal
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tiny"2 '3 branch. Whereas decisions founded upon either the "fundamen-
tal rights" branch of equal protection review214 or upon substantive due
process review do not relieve the Court of the task of making broad pre-
cedent-setting determinations as to which individual rights merit consti-
tutional protection,215 intermediate-level equal protection scrutiny avoids
this difficult issue.216 Rather than focusing on whether the plaintiff in the
suit possesses a constitutionally protected right, intermediate equal pro-
tection review focuses, instead, on an inquiry into the legitimacy of the
state's regulatory methods when state regulation affects plaintiff's
rights.2 17 Thus, applying intermediate equal protection analysis to the
claim of the unwed father in Michael H. would not have entailed a head-
on decision as to whether Michael possessed a "liberty" interest in his
relationship with Victoria. Instead, by applying the Equal Protection
Clause,21 ' the Court could have protected Michael and Victoria from the
harsh effects of the section 621 presumption without triggering Justice
Scalia's concern that fundamental rights would be created or expanded
protection" review merely required a rational relationship between the statutory classification
scheme and the asserted state purpose, whereas the "ends-focused" method required the state
to show the statute furthered a "compelling" state purpose. In contrast with both of these
earlier forms of equal protection review, the emerging "means-focused" equal protection
model required a "substantial relation" between the legislative classification and the legislative
purpose. Thus the new "means-focused" review limited, not the ends a state sought to achieve,
but instead, the statutory means the state could use to achieve those ends.
213. See L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 1561-65, 1601-18. Professor Tribe identifies gender
discrimination as a "sensitive" but not "suspect" criterion for statutory classifications, the use
of which attracts an "intermediate" level of statutory scrutiny which, unlike "strict scrutiny"
and "rational relation scrutiny," provides a "middle tier" of analysis which is sometimes, but
not always, fatal. Id. at 1610, 1613.
214. Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality as a Surrogate for Other Rights,
59 TUL. L. REv. 884, 885 (1985) (identifying the "fundamental-rights-equal-protection"
branch of equal protection analysis). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 1454-65, for a
description of the fundamental rights branch of equal protection.
215. See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341,
361-65 (1949) (equating the substantive rights protected under fundamental rights-based equal
protection and under substantive due process analysis and pointing out that "shifting a right
from the protection of due process to the protection of the equal protection clause neither
clarifies nor simplifies the problem of the 'absolute' character of a right nor eases the problem
of determining what particular rights are to be regarded as enjoying equal protection." Id at
364).
216. See L. TRIBE, supra note 81, 1601-16. See generally Cohen, supra note 214. Professor
Cohen examined Supreme Court decisions employing both substantive due process and "fun-
damental rights" equal protection review and compared them with decisions employing the
intermediate level of equal protection review. Professor Cohen found that the Court used
intermediate-level equal protection to avoid considering difficult issues and to avoid the
broader sweep of the precedent which would otherwise result from substantive due process or
fundamental rights-based equal protection review.
217. See supra note 212.
218. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
without an adequate constitutional basis.219 The Court could thereby
have avoided the lengthy debate between Justice Brennan and Justice
Scalia in the opinion in Michael H. over the correct technique for identi-
fying constitutionally protected fundamental rights.22°
b. Intermediate Level Scrutiny Based on Gender-Based Discrimination
in Section 621
Had jurisdictional considerations not precluded equal protection
scrutiny, the result in Michael H. v. Gerald D. could have been different.
If the Supreme Court had been able to consider Michael's equal protec-
tion claim, the Court could properly have applied intermediate-level
equal protection scrutiny to strike down the application of California Ev-
idence Code section 621.221 Application of intermediate level scrutiny to
section 621 would have been proper because section 621 discriminates
against unwed fathers,222 and equal protection doctrine requires that the
state have constitutionally legitimate reasons for such discrimination.223
Under the intermediate standard of review invoked by gender-based dis-
crimination, a gender-based statutory distinction" 'must serve important
governmental objectives and must be.substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.' ,224 Thus, the Court could have used gender-based
equal protection analysis to protect Michael and Victoria's parent-child
relationship from unjustifiable statutory discrimination without finding
that Michael had a constitutional right to preserve that relationship.
2. Application of Supreme Court Precedent Restricting Gender-Based
Discrimination
Existing Supreme Court precedent supports the invalidation of Cali-
fornia's use of section 621 to terminate Michael's parental rights. The
219. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion)
'Mat the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights
should not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this Court, is
the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the
design of the Constitution."
(quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
220. See supra notes 140-190 and accompanying text.
221. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989).
222. Section 621 grants different rights to the mothers and fathers of children born as the
result of adulterous affairs. If the mother is married, the adulterous biological father will have
parental status only if the mother chooses to rebut the presumption of paternity, whereas the
mother always has parental status and the resulting rights accorded to parents by the state.
CAL. Evm. CODE § 621.
223. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976).
224. Caban, 441 U.S. at 388 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 197); see also Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983).
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decision in Caban v. Mohammed225 supports Michael's claim that sec-
tion 621 impermissibly discriminates against him on the basis of gender.
In Caban, the Court used equal. protection review to strike down the
application of a New York statute that required the consent of the
mother prior to the adoption of a child born out of wedlock without
requiring the same consent of the child's father.226 The Court held that,
when the unwed father has developed a substantial relationship with his
offspring,22 7 this sex-based classification is an "overbroad generaliza-
tion '2  that creates an ."undifferentiated distinction between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers." '229 The Court said that such overbroad sex-
based classifications cannot be upheld when they do not "bear a substan-
tial relationship to the State's asserted interests"230 in the welfare of the
child.23'
a. Gender-Based Discrimination in. Section 621
The effect of the California statute challenged in Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D. is to draw an impermissible sex-based distinction between the
rights accorded adulterous mothers and their male paramours because
section 621 allows a. married, adulterous mother standing to rebut the
presumption of paternity232 while denying this same opportunity to the
adulterous father.233
The statute's differential effects on the members of the adulterous
pair, are twofold. First, the mother alone among the two has the power
to defeat the conclusive presumption 234 and thereby to open the door to
legal recognition of the natural father's parental status and the rights
which flow from that status.235 Second; the mother, unlike the biological
225. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
226. Id at 385-87,'394.
227. Id at 392-93.
228. Id at 394.
229. Id.
230. Id
231. Id at 390-91. The Court identified the state interest as the promotion of the adoption
of illegitimate children.
232. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(d) (West Supp. 1989) ("The notice of motion for blood tests
under subdivision (b) may be raised by the mother of the child not later than two years from
the child's date of birth if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court
acknowledging paternity of the child." (emphasis added)).
233. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (presuming paternity in a husband who cohabitates
with his wife unless he can be shown to be impotent or sterile).
234. The mother's husband is also permitted under California Evidence Code § 621(c) to
rebut the presumption. His right of rebuttal differs slightly from his wife's in that he can act
alone, whereas the mother cannot rebut the presumption without evidence that the biological
father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging his paternity. Compare CAL. EVID.
CODE § 621(c) with CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(d).
235. Only the mother and her husband have standing under California Evidence Code
§ 621(b) to move for the introduction of expert testimony based on blood tests to rebut the
father, is never without parental rights because she is always presumed to
be a legal parent. In contrast, the adulterous natural father can never
assert his parental rights without the cooperation of the mother or the
mother's husband.236
b. Impermissible Gender-Based Discrimination When Mother and
Father Are "Similarly Situated"
The Supreme Court has held that statutes drawing gender-based dis-
tinctions "may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where
[unmarried] mother[s] and [unmarried] father[s] are in fact similarly sit-
uated with regard to their relationship with their child." '2 37 Although a
mother's relationship with her child is inherently different from the fa-
ther's because she carries and gives birth to the child, the Court found in
Caban that this inherent difference becomes insignificant when the father
has "established a substantial relationship with the child and has admit-
ted his paternity." '238 Under these circumstances, the Court held that the
challenged New York statute granting differing adoption-veto rights to
unmarried mothers and fathers did not bear a substantial relationship to
the proclaimed state interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate
children.
239
As in Caban, the biological parents in Michael H. were situated sim-
ilarly in relation to their child. Michael had established a parent-child
relationship with Victoria, and he had admitted his paternity. 24
Although Michael and Carole's personal circumstances were admittedly
otherwise conclusive presumption of the husband's paternity, thus removing the bar against
introduction of blood test evidence proving the biological father's paternity. See CAL. EviD.
CODE § 621(c), (d).
236. The practical result of this difference in treatment of the adulterous parents in Michael
H. was that, under California Civil'Code § 4601, Michael, as a non-parent, was deprived of
parental rights to visitation without any determination that it was not in Victoria's best interest
for the biological father to have visitation rights. In contrast, Carole's status as a legal parent
guaranteed that she could only be deprived of entitlement to visitation rights based on a court
determination that she was an unfit parent or that, for some other reason, it would be in
Victoria's best interests to cut off her mother's visitation rights. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601
(West Supp. 1989). Although Justice Stevens, in his due process analysis, did not recognize
that classification as an "other person" rather than as a "parent" under sectiorf 4601 resulted
in a significant change in Michael's substantive rights, see supra notes I 14-116 'md accompany-
ing text, under an, equal protection analysis it would be difficult to deny that the shift in the
burden of persuasion regarding proof of the best interests of the child constitutes different
treatment of the adulterous parents.
237. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause did not guarantee an unwed father notice prior to termination of his parental rights by
adoption because, unlike the mother, who had established a custodial relationship with the
child, the father had never "'come forward to participate in the rearing of his child.'" Id.
(quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979))).
238. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979).
239. Id
240. See supranotes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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different because Carole was married and Michael was single, their mari-
tal circumstances were the same as in Caban; in both Caban and Michael
H. the biological parents were not married to each other at the time of
conception and, at the time of the suit, the mother was married to a man
who was not the biological father.241
c. Constitutional Requirement of "Substantial Relationship to Important
State Purpose"
A state is not prevented from enacting gender-based statutory classi-
fications that substantially relate to important state purposes.242 Section
621, however, could not have met this standard. California's asserted
purpose for the section 621 conclusive presumption is to hold the hus-
band responsible for the child and to protect the integrity of the family
unit by "excluding inquiries into the child's paternity that would be de-
structive of family integrity and privacy."243 Additionally, the state
claimed the purpose of the paternal presumption is to protect "the inno-
cent child from the social stigma of illegitimacy." 244
Section 621 serves none of these objectives. Justice White pointed
out the irrelevancy of the state's asserted objective in the circumstances
present in Michael H. He observed that "[t]he interest in protecting a
child from the social stigma of illegitimacy lacks any real connection to
the facts of a case where a father is seeking to establish, rather than repu-
diate, [his] paternity. 245
Moreover, section 621 itself undermines the state's asserted purpose
by permitting the husband to rebut the marital presumption without
identifying the biological father. Section 621 thus departs from its as-
serted purpose, not only by failing to protect the child from the stigma of
illegitimacy, but also by failing to achieve the state interest in providing
for the child's continuing support. Rather than obligating the mother's
husband to support the child unless there is some guarantee that the nat-
ural father will take over these duties, section 621 permits the husband to
disclaim responsibility for the child even in circumstances where the nat-
ural father has not agreed to support the child himself.
241. In Caban, the unwed mother had left the biological father and married another man.
The issue in the case arose from the stepfather's attempts to adopt the children. 441 U.S. at
382-84.
242. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge,
previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
243. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816 (1987).
244. Michael H., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 816; Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at
2362 (White, J., dissenting).
245. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2362 (White, J., dissenting).
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Section 621 also falters in its purpose of preserving the marital fam-
ily from outside claims. Although the marital presumption does reduce
the likelihood that the father will succeed on his claim, the statute does
not prevent him from bringing his claim. 2" Even more corrosive of the
state objective of preserving family privacy is the reality that section 621
forces the natural father to use the most intrusive means possible to at-
tempt to prove his paternity. Instead of being permitted to present blood
tests that prove his paternity with almost complete certainty, the biologi-
cal father must initiate an invasive factual inquiry into the husband's fer-
tility or virility.247
More important than the statute's failure to serve its expressly
stated objectives of preserving the marital family and protecting the child
from the stigma and loss of paternal financial support associated with
illegitimacy is the statute's failure to achieve its much more critical un-
derlying goal of protecting the best interests of the child. Section 621
does not serve Victoria's interests well. Instead of allowing Michael to
continue his established relationship with Victoria, the section 621 pre-
sumption effectively cuts Victoria off forever from the financial and emo-
tional support of a man she calls "Daddy."24
Critical examination of the effects of section 621 reveals that the
statute discriminates on the basis of gender in circumstances when, by
virtue of the father's substantial relationship with the child, the biological
mother and father are actually similarly situated with respect to the
child.
Furthermore, the gender-based classification in section 621 does not
advance the asserted state interest in the welfare of the family and the
child. For these reasons, courts should apply intermediate level equal
protection review to strike down statutes like California Evidence Code
section 621 and, by so doing, extend constitutional protection to unwed
fathers whose parental rights are otherwise unprotected by substantive
due process review.-
ITM. Conclusion
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court refused constitu-
tional due process protection to an adulterous unwed father despite his
determined pursuit of the parental rights denied him by California's stat-
utory marital presumption of paternity. In so doing, the Justices used
the unhappy facts of the case to debate at length, but without definitive
246, Id
247. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (disallowing submission of blood test evidence except by
the mother or her husband but creating an exception to the marital presumption in cases where
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results, the proper scope of fundamental rights protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause.
At the end of the debate the Court found itself split into two equal
camps of four Justices over the dual question of the efficacy of looking to
tradition for guidance as to the scope of fundamental rights and as to the
proper way to search for that tradition. Justice Stevens declined to join
the debate, however, thus leaving resolution of the argument to another
day.
As a consequence of this failure to resolve the central issue of the
case, the decision in Michael H. should be construed very narrowly to
apply only to cases with facts nearly identical to those considered by the
Court. The decision thus creates little change in the due process rights of
unwed fathers.
Finally, the decision in Michael H. should not be construed to fore-
close an equal protection claim by an adulterous unwed father who has a
substantial relationship with his child. On the contrary, judges should
use intermediate level equal protection analysis to construct a narrower
ground for decision that enables courts to protect individual unwed fa-
thers from unfair deprivation of their parental rights without requiring
further expansion of the scope of constitutionally protected fundamental
rights.
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